

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

Reference Designator: N/A
 Part Name (Qty): Neck Seal (1)
 Drawing Reference: SED33105590

Project: Government Furnished Equipment
 LRU Name (Qty): ACES Coverall (1)
 LRU Part No.: SED33105590

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 Subsystem: CES
 Effectivity: All Orbiters

Failure Mode Number	Criticality	Failure Effect	Retention Reason
7.1.1	1R/2		
Function		End Item	1. DESIGN FEATURES TO MINIMIZE FAILURE MODE
Permits gas tight seal between breathing cavity and suit compartment. Provides for positive pressure of breathing oxygen and separation of breathing oxygen and ventilation air.		Premature depletion of emergency oxygen system supply	A. Neck seal fabricated of neoprene material, same as material in use by the Air Force high altitude suits and Launch entry suit since STS-26. B. Neck seal designed to experience only 1.5 inches of water differential pressure. C. Capable of withstanding 7.0 psig.
Failure Mode and Cause		Mission	2. TEST OR ANALYSIS TO DETECT FAILURE MODE
Mode: Neck seal fails/leakage Cause: 1. Defective material 2. Overstress during donn and doff	N/A		A. Acceptance Test (PS2B/CEE-1092) 1. Breathing cavity leak test at 1.5 inches of water (spec: 100 scfm) 2. Neck seal sized for individual crewmembers
		Crew/Vehicle	B. Certification (JSC 38024) 1. Neck seal part of full pressure endurance pressure cycling to 500 cycles 2. Manned hypobaric testing to 75,000 ft., rapid decompression from 20,000 to 65,000 ft., verified to maintain positive pressure in breathing cavity
Redundancy	Remaining Paths - 1		C. Turnaround Testing
Seconds	Previous Orbiter failure requiring pad egress and use of emergency oxygen system		1. Breathing cavity leak test at 1.5 inches of water (spec: 100 scfm)
A- Pass			
B- N/A			
C- Pass			
Mission Phase	Time to Effect	Time to Correct	
Pad Egress	Seconds	N/A	

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Failure Mode Number	Criticality	Failure Effect	Retention	Rationale
7.1.1	1R/2			
Function		<u>End Item</u>	3. INSPECTION	
Permits gas tight seal between breathing cavity and suit compartment. Provides for positive pressure of breathing oxygen and separation of breathing oxygen and ventilation air.		Premature depletion of emergency oxygen system supply	A. Acceptance Inspection (P528/CEE-1145)	
Failure Mode and Causes			1. Government source inspection during fabrication and installation in suit 2. Visual inspection of seams and pressure sealing surface of neck seal	
Mode: Neck seal fails/leakage		<u>Mission</u>	B. Turnaround Inspection	
Causes:		N/A	1. Verification of neck seal sized to individual crewmember 2. Inspection of neck seal seams on breathing cavity and sealing integrity (PIA)	
1. Defective material 2. Overstress during donn and doff		<u>Crew/Vehicle</u>	4. FAILURE HISTORY	
		Loss of crewmember	None. This style neck seal is currently in use by the Air Force in high altitude pressure suits and the LES since STS-26.	
Redundancy	Remaining Paths = 1		5. OPERATIONAL USE	
Screen	Previous Orbiter failure requiring pad egress and use of emergency oxygen system	<u>Interface</u>	A. Operational effect of failure - possible loss of crewmember	
A-Pass			B. Crew action - None	
B-N/A			C. Crew training - crew trained in the correct use of ACES	
C-Pass			D. Mission constraints - None - Crew could inspect neck seal before donning suit	
Mission Phase	Time to Effect	Time to Correct	E. Inflight checkout - None - Crew could inspect neck seal before suit donning. A small tear could possibly be repaired with general purpose tape	
Pad Egress	Seconds	N/A		

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Superseding Date: N/A

Approved By: B.W. Sausier

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